This paper studies the hypothesis that controls on on-budget government spending leads to greater off-budget activity. Existence of a substitution effect suggests that our ability to control and measure the size of government is more difficult than previously thought.
Introduction
Modeling public sector growth is complex since government activities take many forms: on-budget spending, subsidies, tariffs, quotas, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), laws, regulations and guaranteed loans. This paper studies the hypothesis that direct and indirect controls (e.g., tax-an-ex penditure limitations, election periods, taxpayer revolt/complaints related to existing tax burdens) on government activities lead to substitution from controlled activities to those activities not subject to those controls. We examine the causal relation between the on-budget spending and off-budget (GSEs) activities of state and local (S&L) governments.
Evasion of controls
Lack of useful data is the primary reason why little research has been conducted on the evasion of controls by governments. Because of their visibility, most controls are placed on on-budget spending. For example, balanced budget rules are commonly placed on deficit numbers that are determined by the difference between on-budget revenues and expenditures. However, many off-budget activities exist and, to some extent, are substitutable with one another. For example, subsidies to domestic firms and import restrictions on foreign competitors are substitutable activities. Another example is a law requiring all employers to provide minimum levels of health insurance as a substitute for on-budget government provision. Congressional Budget Office, CBO, (1983) and Bennett and * The views expressed here are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the U.S. Department of Treasury. DiLorenzo (1982) provide examples of political circumvention of controls on on-budget activities. Circumvention often takes the form of off-budget public enterprises, or GSEs. Bennett and DiLorenzo argue that because the finances of GSEs are not usually approved by voters, GSEs offer an excellent outlet for the 'constrained' politician. Marlow and 10ulfaian (1989) find that govern ments with large on-budget sectors also have relatively large off-budget sectors as well.
A recent example of a GSE is FICO (The Financing Corporation) which, in 1987, was granted authority to issue $10.8 billion in debt to be used by FSLIC to liquidate, or merge with healthier firms, insolvent savings and loans. Even though FICO was created by government, is operated by government appointees and serves solely to finance a government activity (deposit insurance), its activities do not show up on the government's books and its debt exerts no net effect on on-budget spending.
1 Events in fiscally-distressed Massachusetts provide another example. During 1989, the Governor and state legislatures were under pressure to reduce the state's widening budget deficit without incurring cuts in services or raising taxes. To this end, the state government stopped paying for snow removal expenditures on the Massachusetts Turnpike but required the Authority, a GSE, to continue such services. The latter is empowered to set whatever toll rates its deems necessary to cover its expenditures. Consequently, the Authority raised its rates by at least 30% as an administrative decision which does not require the approval of the legislature. While service level was unchanged, the state's books showed a reduction in spending and the deficit. Of course, taxpayers continue to pay for the service.
Empirical evidence
Granger-causality tests are conducted using annual data on the on-budget and off-budget (GSE) activities of S&L governments over the only currently-available time period, 1963-1986. 2 On-budget data are the expenditures of S&L governments (net of federal grants) as reported in Tax Foundation (1988) . Off-budget data are defined as the gross state product (GSP) of GSEs as reported in the U.S. Department of Commerce (1988) and is sum of the earnings, subsidies, and the surpluses or deficits of such establishments. These GSEs encompass power, electric, gas, water, sewage, transportation, highways and lotteries. Evidence in support of our hypothesis would be indicated by off-budget causing on-budget activity. Bi-directional causality would suggest that the two activities determine each other while lack of causality suggests that no relations exist.
Two definitions of activities are considered: Nominal and as percentages of GSP. The latter specification suggests the direction of the relative importance of government activities as a share of the economy and partially solves the problem of finding a mutually appropriate deflator for on-budget spending and the output of the GSEs. To determine if the data are stationary, we regressed the data on a simple time trend. 3 Appropriate transformations appear to be log first-dif ference for on-budget spending and log second-difference for GSE output. We have chosen symmetric lag lengths, ranging from one-to-five years. 4 Table 1 displays the Granger-causality tests. The partial F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all coefficients on the lagged causal independent values are zero. The t-statistics on the sum of the coefficients of past values of 'causal' variables test if they, as a sum, exert any permanent influences on the dependent variable. If not, then any influences are transitory in nature. Test statistics indicate that on-budget activities lead and hence 'cause' off-budget activities. Overall, causal influences are found to be permanent and to carry a negative sign which suggests that past increases in on-budget activities cause decreases in current off-budget activities. With the exception of the (4, 4) lag structure in the percent of GSP specification, all F-and (-statistics reject the hypothesis of no relation.
Conclusion
Evidence of a permanent causal influence running from on-budget activity to off-budget activity indicates support for the hypothesis that a degree of substitution exists between these two activities. The negative direction may indicate that past growth in on-budget activities have led to greater constraints on that activity and therefore to greater substitution into off-budget activities. The evidence should not be interpreted as indicating that past increasing levels of on-budget activity lead to decreasing levels of off-budget activity. Rather, the results indicate that past positive growth in on-budget activity has led to lower changes in growth in off-budget activity. The essential difference is that the latter interpretation does not necessarily suggest that this substitution must cause total government size to either rise or fall; only that there exists some degree of substitutability between on-budget and off-budget growth. This substitution suggests that measurement of government requires listing of its many diverse activities. A growing off-budget sector suggests the difficulty in attempting to control government when controls are only placed on on-budget activities.
